RUSTSEC-2026-0181: DoS vulnerability in HTTP/1.x chunked encoding parser triggered by maliciously crafted chunk lengths

What to do

1. See which version you have: cargo tree -i vibeio-http (it also shows which of your dependencies pulls it in).
2. Update within your version requirement: cargo update -p vibeio-http. If the fix is a newer major or minor than your requirement allows, raise it in Cargo.toml (for example vibeio-http = "0.3.2") or update the dependency that pulls it in.
3. Check again with cargo audit, or paste your Cargo.lock into our Cargo.toml checker.

Details from the advisory

When using the affected versions of the vibeio-http crate, an attacker could craft a malicious HTTP/1.x request with a large chunk length (between usize::MAX - 1 and usize::MAX inclusive) and send it, causing the server to crash (integer overflow panic in debug builds, split_to out of bounds panic in release builds).

This was fixed in vibeio-http 0.3.2 by erroring on the chunk length if it exceeds usize::MAX - 2 (using checked_add() instead of + operator), preventing integer overflow.

References

• Package: crates.io/crates/vibeio-http
• Advisory: rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0181.html
• Web: github.com/ferronweb/vibeio-http/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#vibeio-http-032

From the RustSec Advisory Database (CC0-1.0) via the OSV export, downloaded Oct 24, 2026. Severity score computed from the published CVSS vector.