Rust advisories / tract-nnef
Vulnerability MediumRUSTSEC-2026-0217 · tract-nnef
RUSTSEC-2026-0217: Integer overflow in tract-nnef NNEF tensor parser leads to out-of-bounds read on model load
Short answerA security vulnerability in the tract-nnef crate: Integer overflow in tract-nnef NNEF tensor parser leads to out-of-bounds read on model load. Medium severity (CVSS 6.1). Fixed in 0.21.16, 0.22.2, 0.23.1: update to a fixed version.
| Crate | tract-nnef |
|---|---|
| Type | Vulnerability (memory-exposure, denial-of-service) |
| Affected versions | Before 0.21.16; from 0.22.0 before 0.22.2; from 0.23.0 before 0.23.1. |
| Fixed in | 0.21.16, 0.22.2, 0.23.1 |
| Severity | Medium, CVSS 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H |
| Published | 2026-06-18 |
| Last changed | 2026-10-12 |
| Also known as | CVE-2026-55093, GHSA-x5mv-8wgw-29hg |
| Affected functions | tract_nnef::tensors::read_tensor |
What to do
- See which version you have:
cargo tree -i tract-nnef(it also shows which of your dependencies pulls it in). - Update within your version requirement:
cargo update -p tract-nnef. If the fix is a newer major or minor than your requirement allows, raise it in Cargo.toml (for exampletract-nnef = "0.23.1") or update the dependency that pulls it in. - Check again with
cargo audit, or paste your Cargo.lock into our Cargo.toml checker.
Details from the advisory
tract_nnef::tensors::read_tensor builds a tensor shape from attacker-controlled 32-bit dimensions and computes both the element count product(shape) and the byte allocation product(shape) * size_of(dt) with **unchecked usize arithmetic**. In release builds (no overflow-checks) both products wrap modulo 2^64.
A crafted NNEF .dat tensor can choose dimensions whose wrapped products collapse to a small value that satisfies the header size-consistency check, while the true element count stays astronomically large. read_tensor then returns a Tensor whose reported len (e.g. 2^61 + 7) far exceeds its backing heap allocation (e.g. 56 bytes). The unchecked accessor as_slice_unchecked (slice::from_raw_parts(ptr, self.len())) subsequently yields a slice spanning ~18 EiB over the small buffer.
The out-of-bounds read fires automatically during model build (no inference required), reachable through the default DatLoader resource loader via the public tract_nnef::nnef().model_for_path / model_for_read API when the const-folding as_uniform fast-path materializes the over-long constant. The always-on primitive is a bounded adjacent-heap over-read (information disclosure); access further past the mapped region SIGSEGVs (denial of service). No out-of-bounds write or code execution was demonstrated.
Affected: every release line prior to the backported fixes , < 0.21.16, 0.22.0-0.22.1, and 0.23.0. The block-quant path had already received an analogous blob-size guard; the dense DatLoader path was missed.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 0.21.16, 0.22.2, or 0.23.1. The fix computes the shape product and byte size with checked_mul and rejects the tensor on overflow (commit 34c7df2).
References
- Package: crates.io/crates/tract-nnef
- Advisory: rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0217.html
- Web: github.com/sonos/tract/commit/34c7df2c9bd2a36583e09b52f3e6319bf23102e8
- Web: github.com/sonos/tract/commit/34c7df2c9bd2a36583e09b52f3e6319bf23102e8
From the RustSec Advisory Database (CC0-1.0) via the OSV export, downloaded Oct 24, 2026. Severity score computed from the published CVSS vector.
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