Vulnerability HighRUSTSEC-2026-0290 · pqc_kyber
RUSTSEC-2026-0290: pqc_kyber: AVX2 backend skips Fujisaki-Okamoto implicit rejection, enabling chosen-ciphertext key recovery
Short answerA security vulnerability in the pqc_kyber crate: pqc_kyber: AVX2 backend skips Fujisaki-Okamoto implicit rejection, enabling chosen-ciphertext key recovery. High severity (CVSS 7.4). No fixed version: replace the crate or remove the affected code path.
| Crate | pqc_kyber |
|---|---|
| Type | Vulnerability (crypto-failure) |
| Affected versions | Every version. |
| Fixed in | none |
| Severity | High, CVSS 7.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N |
| Published | 2026-08-16 |
| Last changed | 2026-09-18 |
| Also known as | none |
What to do
- Find who pulls it in:
cargo tree -i pqc_kyber. - Avoid the affected API, or replace the crate.
Details from the advisory
Summary
When pqc_kyber is built with the opt-in avx2 feature on x86_64, its constant-time conditional-move routine cmov is a no-op: it never performs the copy. That cmov is exactly the step that applies the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) implicit rejection during decapsulation. With it disabled, decapsulating an *invalid* ciphertext no longer returns a key-independent pseudorandom value; it returns a value that depends on the decrypted plaintext of the attacker-chosen ciphertext. This restores the chosen-ciphertext decryption oracle that the FO transform exists to remove, and yields full recovery of the static secret key.
The attack requires no timing measurement, no side channel, and no faults; only the ability to submit ciphertexts to a decapsulation operation under a reused key pair and observe the resulting shared secret. See the linked pull request for the root cause, the reachable call path, and reproduction details.
Affected configuration
Reachable only in builds with features = ["avx2"] on an x86_64 target. The default (reference) backend and all non-x86_64 targets are unaffected.
Impact
Complete IND-CCA break. The plaintext-checking oracle drives a standard chosen-ciphertext key-recovery attack and extracts the entire static secret key. Any protocol reusing a Kyber key pair across decapsulations (static or long-term KEM keys, KEMTLS, HPKE recipients, pinned keys) is exposed; ephemeral-only key shares are not. The defect was verified end to end on ML-KEM-768: the full secret key was recovered in 4,272 decapsulation queries.
Maintenance status
The crate is unmaintained (last release 0.7.1, August 2023); no patched version exists or is expected.
Mitigation
- If remaining on this crate, do not enable the
avx2feature; the default reference backend performs implicit rejection correctly. - Do not reuse a Kyber key pair across decapsulations.
Credit
Reported by 007bsd.
References
- Package: crates.io/crates/pqc_kyber
- Advisory: rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0290.html
- Web: github.com/Argyle-Software/kyber/pull/121
From the RustSec Advisory Database (CC0-1.0) via the OSV export, downloaded Oct 24, 2026. Severity score computed from the published CVSS vector.
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