RUSTSEC-2026-0333: Resource budgets not enforced on the typed deserialization path

What to do

1. See which version you have: cargo tree -i noyalib (it also shows which of your dependencies pulls it in).
2. Update within your version requirement: cargo update -p noyalib. If the fix is a newer major or minor than your requirement allows, raise it in Cargo.toml (for example noyalib = "0.0.53") or update the dependency that pulls it in.
3. Check again with cargo audit, or paste your Cargo.lock into our Cargo.toml checker.

Details from the advisory

ParserConfig::max_events, max_nodes, max_total_scalar_bytes, max_merge_keys, alias_anchor_ratio and the alias jump factor were enforced only by the two Value loaders. A typed target with a default-shaped configuration is served by the streaming deserializer, which never read those fields, so tightening any of them had no effect on from_str::<T> for a struct target. The default document-length, depth and alias-count caps were enforced on every path, so no input was unbounded; the gap affects callers who tightened the other budgets for hostile input.

Version 0.0.53 charges every budget on the streaming path as well and adds cross-path parity tests.

Users who cannot upgrade can deserialize into noyalib::Value first and convert with from_value, or rely on max_document_length and max_depth, which were always applied on every path.

References

• Package: crates.io/crates/noyalib
• Advisory: rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0333.html
• Web: github.com/sebastienrousseau/noyalib/pull/470

From the RustSec Advisory Database (CC0-1.0) via the OSV export, downloaded Oct 24, 2026. Severity score computed from the published CVSS vector.