Vulnerability HighRUSTSEC-2026-0344 · ruzstd
RUSTSEC-2026-0344: Decompression bomb in `ruzstd`: a tiny input can exhaust memory (OOM)
Short answerA security vulnerability in the ruzstd crate: Decompression bomb in `ruzstd`: a tiny input can exhaust memory (OOM). High severity (CVSS 7.5). Fixed in 0.9.1: update to a fixed version.
| Crate | ruzstd |
|---|---|
| Type | Vulnerability (denial-of-service) |
| Affected versions | Before 0.9.1. |
| Fixed in | 0.9.1 |
| Severity | High, CVSS 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
| Published | 2026-10-11 |
| Last changed | 2026-10-13 |
| Also known as | none |
What to do
- See which version you have:
cargo tree -i ruzstd(it also shows which of your dependencies pulls it in). - Update within your version requirement:
cargo update -p ruzstd. If the fix is a newer major or minor than your requirement allows, raise it in Cargo.toml (for exampleruzstd = "0.9.1") or update the dependency that pulls it in. - Check again with
cargo audit, or paste your Cargo.lock into our Cargo.toml checker.
Details from the advisory
A crafted .zst input under 128 KB can force ruzstd to allocate several gigabytes at once, crashing the process with an out-of-memory condition. Since ruzstd is a decoder for untrusted input, a single small file is enough to take down anything decoding it.
The compressed size of a block was capped at 128 KB, but a compressed block's **decompressed** size was never checked against Block_Maximum_Size = min(Window_Size, 128 KiB) (RFC 8878). In execute_sequences the output was built with no running bound and no flush between blocks, so one block could expand to gigabytes , bypassing both the configured window-size limit and the block-by-block streaming that would otherwise release memory. (A related u32 counter overflow on such a block caused an additional panic.)
This is a denial of service only; memory access stays in bounds (no corruption, no RCE).
ruzstd is also built as a dependency of the Rust standard library via rustc-dep-of-std; in the toolchain it is used only to load zstd-compressed debug symbols, so the toolchain-side impact is limited.
**Fixed in 0.9.1** (commit d3907c9), which enforces the per-block output bound. Upgrade to ruzstd >= 0.9.1.
References
- Package: crates.io/crates/ruzstd
- Advisory: rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0344.html
- Web: github.com/KillingSpark/zstd-rs/commit/d3907c960ca4a1aa44cc38340137c5679dd98f5a
From the RustSec Advisory Database (CC0-1.0) via the OSV export, downloaded Oct 24, 2026. Severity score computed from the published CVSS vector.
Other advisories for ruzstd
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