Vulnerability MediumRUSTSEC-2026-0152 · oneringbuf
RUSTSEC-2026-0152: Use-after-free
Short answerA security vulnerability in the oneringbuf crate: Use-after-free. GitHub rates it Medium. Fixed in 0.8.0: update to a fixed version.
| Crate | oneringbuf |
|---|---|
| Type | Vulnerability (memory-corruption) |
| Affected versions | Before 0.8.0. |
| Fixed in | 0.8.0 |
| Severity | Medium (GitHub rating) |
| Published | 2026-05-27 |
| Last changed | 2026-08-04 |
| Also known as | GHSA-q95x-7g78-rccv |
What to do
- See which version you have:
cargo tree -i oneringbuf(it also shows which of your dependencies pulls it in). - Update within your version requirement:
cargo update -p oneringbuf. If the fix is a newer major or minor than your requirement allows, raise it in Cargo.toml (for exampleoneringbuf = "0.8.0") or update the dependency that pulls it in. - Check again with
cargo audit, or paste your Cargo.lock into our Cargo.toml checker.
Details from the advisory
Affected versions of oneringbuf exposed the obsolete IntoRef::into_ref method through the public IntoRef trait. For heap-backed ring buffers, this method returned a DroppableRef handle.
DroppableRef stored an owning raw pointer created from Box::into_raw. Its Clone implementation copied this raw pointer without incrementing the internal alive_iters counter. Internally, this clone pattern appears to rely on a fixed number of handles being created to match the initial alive_iters value. However, exposing DroppableRef through the public IntoRef::TargetRef associated type allows safe external code to create additional clones beyond that fixed count, breaking the lifetime protocol. Drop later dereferenced the pointer and could free the backing allocation with Box::from_raw.
Safe code could call IntoRef::into_ref to obtain a DroppableRef and then clone it. Each clone pointed to the same allocation, but the internal alive_iters counter was not increased. As a result, one clone could free the allocation while another clone still existed. Dropping the remaining clone then accessed freed memory, causing a heap-use-after-free.
The issue was fixed in version 0.8.0 by removing the obsolete into_ref method.
Trigger
use oneringbuf::{IntoRef, LocalHeapRB};
fn main() {
let rb = LocalHeapRB::<usize>::from(vec![1, 2, 3]);
let r = <LocalHeapRB<usize> as IntoRef>::into_ref(rb);
let r2 = r.clone();
let r3 = r.clone();
drop(r);
drop(r2);
drop(r3); // AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free
}
References
- Package: crates.io/crates/oneringbuf
- Advisory: rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0152.html
- Web: github.com/skilvingr/rust-oneringbuf/commit/643a24b30914068416dff9021a069c12c865a316
- Web: github.com/skilvingr/rust-oneringbuf/commit/643a24b30914068416dff9021a069c12c865a316
From the RustSec Advisory Database (CC0-1.0) via the OSV export, downloaded Oct 24, 2026. Severity score computed from the published CVSS vector.
Other advisories for oneringbuf
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